Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Introduction
Many countries have liberalised their economies over the past decade, but the driving forces which led to this process are still only poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate whether policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) contribute to the development of economic freedom. As a dependent variable, we use the economic freedom indicator conceived by Gwartney et al. (2000) . The Gwartney index is based on a number of quantifiable measures relating to the various dimensions of economic freedom. Seven subgroups of variables, relating to the size of government, the structure of the economy, the freedom to trade and others, are aggregated into the comprehensive index. The different components of the index are presented below.
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Economic freedom has frequently been used as an independent variable in order to explain country-specific growth rates (de Haan and Sturm 2000; Dawson 1998 ; de Haan and Sierman 1998; Heckelman and Stroup 2000; de Vanssay and Spindler 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1993) . A smaller number of papers attempt to explain the emergence of economic freedom. Lal (1987) , Dawson (1998) and de Haan and Sturm (2001) investigate the political preconditions under which economic reforms become viable. There is some similarity to the question of which are the determinants of political liberty (see Feng and Zak 1999) . Farr et al. (1998) explicitly address the issue of dual causality between economic well-being and economic freedom, using tests for Granger causality. So far, however, the impact of international organisations on economic freedom has not been addressed in this literature. This provides a main motivation of the paper.
The second strand of literature to which this paper contributes concerns the effects of the international financial institutions (IFIs) on the economies of the recipient countries. In spite of the long-term nature of adjustment lending, most existing studies on World Bank and IMF lending have focused on short term 1 A detailed description can be found in Gwartney et al. (2000) . 2 impacts and objectives not under the direct control of the authorities. 2 However, a more meaningful test of international organisations influence on creditors' economies has to focus on long-term developments. Most importantly, the IFIs influence does not only depend on conditions and finance attached to adjustment programs but also on technical advice, often connected with program negotiations but also independent of specific programs, during the IMF's regular surveillance missions. According to Fischer (2001: 237) , one of the IMF's main contribution to reforms is in standing consistently for a particular approach to economic policy.
IMF and World Bank programs, even if classified as failures with respect to their specific goals, may nevertheless be important to change attitudes in developing countries. The international organisation's advice is often discussed publicly and may influence politics in the longer run (Killick 1994: 156) . The change in attitudes will lead to different policies, as measured by the economic freedom indexes.
The focus on policies rather than outcomes provides a third motivation for the paper. Rather than looking at economic variables such as the growth rate of GDP as a result of participation in programs, we are comparing policies chosen by participating governments to the policies chosen by non-participants. While it may be over-ambitious to link international institutions and economic outcomes, it may be feasible to find a link between the former and the choice of policy instruments (Dhonte 1997: 13) . 2 For instance, Ergin (1999) reports that IMF programs result in an (insignificant) reduction in the rate of real GDP growth and an improvement in the current account. Inflation and the overall balance of payments seem to be unaffected by the IMF. With respect to the World Bank, Harrigan and Mosley (1991: 83) report a weak influence of structural adjustment loans on GDP and no significant effect on export growth. Harrigan and Mosley employ dummies for structural adjustment loans lagged one and two years while Ergin uses only one year lags. Evrensel (2000) , Doroodian (1993) and Khan (1990) , among others, present similar studies. Exceptions to the short term focus are Barro and Lee (2001) , Hutchinson (2001) and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) who analyse the IMF's influence on long-term real GDP growth rates.
Potentially, other international organisations apart from the IFIs may also have an impact on economic freedom. 3 We look at the impact of the World Bank and the IMF due to their outstanding importance relative to other organisations.
Moreover, many multilateral lenders attach their money to the IMF's programs. A proper assessment of the IFI's effects on economic policies is also desirable in view of the ongoing debate on the future role of these institutions.
Channels for the impact of the IFIs on economic freedom
There are a number of ways in which the programmes and policies of the IFIs may influence economic liberalisation. First, there is a direct impact of the IMF or the World Bank for the time a country participates in an adjustment programme. This is because countries are only eligible for (phased) credit tranches if they comply with the imposed conditions. These conditions often aim at privatisation and liberalisation, a reduction of inflation and government expenditure. Succeeding programmes may improve economic freedom over time even if most programmes are not implemented as negotiated and some of the money remains undrawn.
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Frequent negotiations between the IFIs and the national actors during the period, especially if some slippage occurs, may foster consensus between the social partners in recipient countries and thus stabilise the support for the measures demanded by the conditionality (Venkate Ratnam 1996: 11) .
In principle, the direct effect of conditionality on national policies might be measured by the amount of IMF or World Bank credit a country receives.
However, conditions and credit volumes need not be proportional, although some 3 Examples that come to mind are the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Labour Organization (ILO) which prohibits the use of forced labor in some of its conventions. 4 Dreher (2001a: 21) finds that in about 60 per cent of past IMF programs more than 25 per cent of the money agreed under the arrangement is not drawn as scheduled. This may be used as an indicator for non-compliance (Killick 1995: 58) . Compliance with Bank conditionality is slightly higher. According to the World Bank (1988), about 60 per cent of the agreed policy changes are implemented. Similar levels of compliance were reported by Nash (1993). conditions are included in almost all programmes. 5 Therefore, the number of arrangements concluded may be a better measure for IFI conditionality than the flows of finances.
Surely, conditionality may also fail to produce the desired results. In this case, subsidised credits may soften the need for economic liberalisation during economic crises and therefore promote the status quo (Collier 2000 : 313, Drake 1998 : 151, Goldstein 1998 , Heller et al. 1998 : 151, Ranis 1996 : 6, Bandow 1994 : 27, Vaubel 1994 . Moreover, governments may not take necessary adjustment measures in order to stay eligible for subsidised credit (Vaubel 1991: 208) . 6 This kind of behaviour is not necessarily prevented by the IFI's conditionality.
Governments may agree only formally to attached conditions and circumvent the programme's spirit with countervailing measures not covered under the programme. It is therefore possible that the IFI's programmes may delay adjustment more than they promote it (Willet 1999: 3) . In this case, the amount of credit received should be negatively related to economic freedom and growthoriented policies. This is consistent with evidence provided by Vásquez (1998: 279) who showed that countries with greater reduction in economic freedom between 1985-90 received increasing inflows of aid and Burnside and Dollar (1997) who did not find any link from aid flows to policy reform.
There is also a less direct route by which economic policies in the recipient countries may be influenced by the IFIs. Some countries simply lack the capacity to reform. In this case, adjustment programmes negotiated with the IFIs may not impose unwanted conditionality but may rather provide welcome advice. This advice might even change governments preferences about adjustment policy, at least in the long run (Haggard and Kaufman 1992) . Fund and Bank may therefore reinforce the liberal consensus (Drake 1998: 78) . World Bank projects may be 5 Dreher (2002) did not find a significant correlation between the number of conditions included in a program and the amount of money drawn. 6 The hypothesis that Fund and Bank lending to some extent provokes moral hazard is supported by empirical studies (Dreher 2001b, Dreher and Vaubel 2001). important not only because of the money attached but also because knowledge is transferred. In this context, the World Bank's technical assistance loans may be of special interest. The transfer of knowledge, however, may take very different routes which are only loosely connected with specific instruments of the IFIs. Another example for the leverage of the IFIs on national policies is the influence of senior officials who were formerly staff members of the IFIs, who may contribute to changing attitudes and steer policy towards liberalisation (Kahler 1992: 127) . The most important way of coming into contact with the IFIs economic knowledge, however, is the negotiation and the implementation of adjustment programmes.
Every loan negotiated with the IFIs brings the recipient country into some degree of contact with these institutions. Thus, the flow of ideas and advice may be also proxied by the number of programmes negotiated, but not by the amount of credit received.
Our discussion leads to the formulation of two hypotheses which will be at the centre of our empirical investigation: -Money attached to the IFI's programmes can either improve or reduce economic freedom. On one hand, it may be associated with more stringent conditionality.
On the other, if conditionality fails, money can be used to prevent reforms and liberalisation. If the number of World Bank or IMF programmes is a better proxy for conditionality than the flow of finances, the amount of credit should be insignificant or actually negative once the number of programmes is controlled for.
-
The number of programmes in operation increases economic freedom due to either the direct effect of conditionality on policies or to the transfer of knowledge and advice, which increases with the number of contacts between a recipient country and the IMF or World Bank.
Empirical estimation of the IFIs' impact
To assess the effect of international institutions on economic freedom empirically, we use a panel of 85 countries which are members of the IFIs but non-members of the OECD. In the estimations presented in the following, the dependent variable is the composite economic liberty index constructed by Gwartney et al. (2000) . Our data cover the years 1970-97. Since the dependent variable is available in intervals of five years, the explanatory variables are averages over the five year period preceding the current year. Some of the data are not available for all countries or every year. Therefore, our panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables.
In our estimations, we use four variables measuring the flow of funds and the number of programmes negotiated with the IMF and the World Bank, respectively.
Precise definitions are given in Appendix A while Appendix B contains descriptive statistics. The flow of monetary resources is measured by the change in the stock of outstanding IMF and World Bank credits. The reason for using this concept instead of directly measuring financial flows is that, according to our hypotheses, both payments from the IFIs as well as repayments should matter for economic freedom.
For instance, if a country repays its debt, it either has to reduce its (primary) budget deficit or needs other sources of financing which it may only obtain if it chooses more liberal economic policies. This is even true if the money needed is raised from taxpayers. In this case, the electorate is more concerned about politics which increases pressure on the government (Collier 2000: 313) .
The number of programmes should ideally include only those programmes that were under effect over much of the year in question. The IMF variable includes the number of arrangements that were active over at least five months in a given calendar year. For the World Bank, however, part of this data was lacking. Hence, we use the number of programmes negotiated in each year as our World Bank variable. A breakdown of programmes and credit volumes according to facilities is provided in Table A1 .
Column 1 of Table 1 contains results from a regression of the Gwartney economic freedom index on these four variables. To account for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity potentially correlated with the regressors, we use a fixed effects specification. Initially, we also included a dummy for each of the five- year periods for which the index is available. However, using an F-test we found it sufficient to include a dummy for the period after the end of the cold war, i.e. from 1990 onward.
The regression results suggest that the World Bank has an impact on economic freedom while the influence of the IMF is less clear. As expected, the number of World Bank projects has a positive impact on economic freedom. The volume of World Bank credits, by contrast, exerts a negative influence on economic freedom. Both coefficients are significantly different from zero at the one per cent level. Given the inclusion of the number of projects, the sum of World Bank credits controls for the average size of the projects in a year and particular country. The lesson seems to be that projects are productive in terms of "good" economic policies, but become counterproductive as their volume expands. The signs of the IMF variable suggest a similar mechanism, but standard errors are relatively high and t-tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero impact at the five per cent level.
In the further columns of Table 1 , we add control variables to account for time-varying observable heterogeneity. We included control variables to account for the following theoretical hypotheses:
7 First, prosperity and growth create an interest in economic freedom. A prosperous middle class will press harder for the introduction and maintenance of economic freedom. Apart from being the product of economic freedom, a minimum level of wealth may also be its precondition.
Second, economic freedom is believed to depend on human capital − − − − the degree to which people are educated and informed. Enrolment in schooling ratios 7
With some of these variables, there is an obvious endogeneity problem: if economic freedom has a beneficial effect on growth, then GDP is endogenous to freedom. The same is true for exports and foreign direct investment, since the Gwartney index contains tariffs and openness to foreign capital as its components. Endogeneity may even be a problem for the involvement of the IFIs. In the framework of the Arellano-Bond estimation discussed below, the right-hand side variables can be instrumented and the validity of the exogeneity assumption can be tested.
and illiteracy rates may thus have a positive relation to economic freedom. Apart from education, means of information and communication may also prove important since they relay information about economic success in other countries (Drake 1998: 75) .
Third, economic freedom will depend on the economic relations with foreign actors. The more a country participates in trade and factor movements, the higher is the need to liberalise in order to stay competitive. Foreign direct investment often comes along with management educated in industrial countries. Management may try to press for liberalisation directly, in order to improve the business environment and enhance profits. Moreover, foreign direct investment creates new jobs in developing countries. Workers need to be trained and educated and may ultimately demand -and get -more economic freedom (Dawson 1998: 612) .
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Exports − − − − in particular, exports into industrialised countries − − − − might affect economic freedom in a similar way. Exporters will lobby their governments to reduce barriers and duties on exports and imports. They will also press for the right to use the currency of their trading partners.
Fourth, apart from being the outcome of economic relations with abroad, economic freedom may be imposed by foreign actors. Development aid and technical cooperation grants may be given purposely in order to improve economic freedom. On the other hand, the same argument as the one made above for the IFIs' involvement applies here as well: the influence of aid on economic freedom could be negative because governments isolated from market forces feel less compelled to bring about reforms.
Fifth, there may also be internal political constellations under which calls for economic liberalisation are more successful than others. Even if there is a strong interest in economic freedom, citizens may lack the political resources to see it enforced. This is particularly true in oppressive political regimes. Ideology may 8 An extensive discussion on the effects of foreign direct investment on the host countries' economies is provided by Bengoa Calvo and Sanchez-Robles (2001).
also be important. The ruling political party may be more or less in favour of liberalisation.
Finally, there are idiosyncratic political and cultural factors which may influence the level of economic freedom. Some of them may be observable, such as colonial history, but most of them cannot be easily measured. As long as these factors do not vary over time, however, they are captured by the inclusion of fixed effects. The fixed effects specification has the effect that only coefficients of variables which vary over time can be estimated.
In the case of each of these factors, there is not one but several variables which could be used to measure its impact on economic freedom. From data sources commonly used in cross-country time-series estimation, we could obtain data for eighteen variables belonging to the groups just defined. Table A2 in the appendix.
without trade, the third concerns trade, income and growth, and the fourth the political variables.
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In the iterative replacement procedure, we started with a static specification (see below) with two variables from each of the groups, replacing them with other covariates from the groups and retaining those which had the highest number of statistically significant coefficients. We dropped variables which did not have a coefficient significant at the five per cent level in more than a third of the regressions run. We then re-ran the procedure using the dynamic model In column 2 of Table 1 , we present results of a regression on the first three of these variables. Independent variables similar to these three are used in a regression by de Haan and Sturm (2001) . As can be seen, exports into industrial countries are significantly positively related to economic freedom, while the other two are not significant. In column 3, we added the secondary schooling rate and the number of radios per capita. Both coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant. Military leadership now affects economic freedom significantly negatively. As a result of the inclusion of the covariates, the World Bank variables become smaller in absolute values but their coefficients are still significant. By contrast, the IMF variables appear to be completely unrelated to economic freedom 10 We also regressed the Gwartney index on the four factors but this procedure left us with too few observations. in column 3. Taken as a whole, the IFI variables are jointly significant at the 5 per cent level (p-value = 0.036).
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The conflicting signs of the coefficients on the number of projects, on one hand, and credit amounts, on the other, may in part be due to high correlation between the two. It is therefore instructive to see whether the coefficients concerning projects react to the exclusion of the credit amounts and vice versa. coefficient is marginally insignificant at the ten per cent level. This negative coefficient is, however, reversed in the 1990s. As in the previous specifications, the IFI variables are jointly significant (p-value = 0.0005).
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Establishing economic freedom is most likely a process which evolves slowly, instead of being accomplished instantaneously. Therefore, we also estimated a dynamic model which includes the lagged dependent variable. Results are contained in Table 2 . In column 1, we present results from within-groups estimation similar to specification 3 from Table 1 , but with the lagged dependent variable included. The latter appears to be highly significant. In the dynamic specification, military rule no longer has a significant influence on economic freedom while economic freedom now rises significantly with technical assistance from abroad. Most importantly, our variables for engagement of the World Bank are in the order of magnitude found in earlier estimations, with the number of projects significant at the five and the credit volume significant at the ten per cent levels. Again, the IMF variables are not significant.
A potential problem with these results is that the within groups estimator is inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a short panel (Nickell 1981 ). Therefore, we applied the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) to our problem. This estimator consists in first-differencing the estimating equation and using lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments. Since there are more instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-identified and instruments must be weighted in an appropriate way. We present only results from the Arellano-Bond one-step GMM1 estimator, which uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step GMM estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the GMM1 estimates. However, in small samples 12 We also tested for non-linearity in the amount of credits. There was some indication of nonlinearity, with a quadratic term which enters the equation positively. However, the overall effect of the credit variable turns positive only for World Bank loans greater than 6.8 percent of GDP.
Such large credits are very rare. however, there are no big differences between the static and dynamic specification.
In the following, we will be working with specification 3 from Table 1 . In Table 3 , we replicate this regression using data on individual facilities for the IFI variables. The amount of World Bank credit used in Tables 1 and 2 we obtain negative coefficients for all of these variables. However, none of the credit variables is individually significant. Thus it seems not possible to ascertain which part of the IFI's activities drives the negative coefficients found earlier.
Using a conventional F-test, we are not able to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients among the different facilities. Hence, the specification used earlier is not rejected.
The number of IMF and World Bank programmes approved are also classified according to different facilities. Again, none of the coefficients are individually significant and their equality cannot be rejected. With respect to the World Bank variables, we find a positive coefficient significant at the ten per cent level for projects not financed by adjustment and technical loans. As with the other subgroups, coefficient equality cannot be rejected.
Finally, we used the number of IMF arrangements and World Bank adjustment loans that were in effect at least 5 months in a given year. Only arrangements under the IMF Structural Adjustment Facility were (marginally) significant, with a negative coefficient.
In a further effort to provide more detailed information on the IFI's impact on economic freedom, we used single components of the Gwartney index instead of the composite index. The motivation is that the World Bank and the IMF only include some of the components of the overall economic freedom index into the conditions for new credits, while others are never made a condition. Hence, we should find an effect in some areas of economic policy but not in others. Results are displayed in Table 4 . We only report the signs of the coefficients for the four World Bank and IMF variables from the specification as in column 3 of Table 1 and indicate whether they are significant at the one, five or ten per cent level.
The results vary widely, both with respect to the overall fit of the regression (as measured by the within R²) and to the significance of the coefficients. It is clear that many of these estimation equations, being a replication of our preferred specification for the composite index, are necessarily misspecified and suffer from omitted variable bias, which is reflected in the small average size of the R².
However, the signs of the significant coefficients are as expected. Similar to the findings for the composite index, World Bank credit is almost always negatively correlated with economic freedom, and in eight cases the coefficient is significant at least at the ten per cent level.
In the light of our earlier considerations, it appears that World Bank money induces countries to have less security of ownership rights, inferior legal institutions, higher inflation levels and volatility, a higher black market premium, less private ownership of banks and more restrictions on the freedom to engage in capital transactions with foreigners.
World Bank programmes are found to have a significant positive influence on the difference between the official and the black market exchange rate.
Although the Bank does not directly force countries to devalue their currencies, some adjustment programmes aim at liberalising the exchange rate (Dreher 2002) .
As a consequence, overvalued currencies may devalue which decreases the black market premium.
Also significant is the Bank's influence on the use of conscripts in national defense systems (which, however, is rather surprising), on interest controls as well as freedom of citizens to engage in capital transactions with foreigners. While conditions on interest rate policy are included in some adjustment programmes, 
Conclusions
Our estimates suggest that the role of the IFIs on economic freedom is ambiguous.
The number of projects increases economic freedom, while the volume of credits reduces freedom. This finding applies not only to the composite freedom index, but also to the individual index components, in spite of the fact that the index components cover very different areas of economic policy, such as monetary or fiscal policy, the quality of the legal system, or barriers to trade. In our Heckelman and Stroup aggregate the single components of economic freedom using an alternative weighting methodology. While their analysis is useful in checking which economic freedoms contribute to growth, this weighting procedure seems to be seriously flawed (Sturm et al. 2001). interpretation, the number of programmes increases freedom because it increases both the conditions imposed by the IFIs and the number of contacts between them and national politicians, which raises the transfer of knowledge. However, if the level of financing associated with the programmes rises, this eases policy constraints for governments, which has a negative impact on governments' willingness to undertake reforms.
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